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Abstract
Measures of health status, such as e.g. the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years) measure, have
been proposed as a tool in the economic assessment of new medical technologies, and its possible
foundations in individual utility theory has been discussed in the literature. However, the problems
of aggregation or interpersonal utility comparison inherent in the application of such measures has
went largely unnoticed. In the present work, we consider a general equilibrium model of a society,
where different aspects of health are identified as Lancasterian characteristics. In this model, we
consider the welfare theoretical basis for evaluation of changes of allocation from a Pareto optimum,
and in particular, we investigate conditions on the economy under which the individuals will have the
same marginal rates of substitution between characteristics, which is a precondition for a meaningful
measurement of health status. It turns out that this equality will obtain only under very restrictive
conditions of separability in characteristics production.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, the growth of expenditure on health in most countries has led to an
increased concern for setting the right priorities and for methods of evaluation of new
medical technologies. Unfortunately, most of the output produced in the health care
sector of society is not directly marketed, and moreover, the final goal of the sector’s
production, health, largely evades precise measurement, thus making investment analysis
along traditional lines quite complicated. It is not surprising, therefore, that attempts to
measure health status or changes in health status has attracted much attention.
There is by now a very extensive literature on health status measurements (see e.g.
Sintonen (1981), Mooney (1986)) and in particular on QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life
Years) (see e.g. Broome (1993), Baldwin, Godfrey, Propper (1990), and the survey in
Mooney (1994)). The basic idea behind such measurements is as follows: A list of
fundamental aspects or characteristics of health is indentified (Sintonen (1986), works with
a total of 11 such characteristics – ability to sleep, walk, see, hear etc.) and different states
of perfection within these characteristics are ranked by a group of individuals. Afterwards,
the characteristics are ranked according to the importance assigned to them by the group,
and positions for each characteristic as well as the weights between characteristics may
now be used to assign numbers to all conceivable states of health.
Other measurements, as e.g. the QALY measurements, introduced in the 1970s, cf.
e.g. Torrance (1986), employ particular techniques to set up scales and assign values (as
the so-called ‘time trade-off’ and ‘standard-gamble’ methods), but the goal is largely the
same, constructing a utility scale for health states. Several authors (cf.e.g. Torrance and
Feeny (1989), Loomes and McKenzie (1989), Bleichrodt, Wakker and Johannesson (1997),
Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1997)) discuss foundational problems of QALY measurement,
where the QALY is viewed as a representation of an individual preference relation defined
on lotteries over health states. We shall not be concerned with these aspects of QALY
measurement on the individual level. What concerns us the application of QALY measures
in aggregate welfare considerations.
Measuring health status or quality of life is important for evaluating society’s gain by
using new medical technologies. A change in treatment involves a change in ressource use
and a change in outcome. If the outcome can be measured in e.g. QALYs, then alternative
technologies may be compared by their QALY scores, that is the amount of dollars given
up per QALY gained. To be able to perform analyses of this type was the main reason for
introducing QALYs, and is is currently being implemented to the extent that tables exist
for QALY gain per dollar in a large number of new technologies.
Below we outline briefly the role of health measures in cost-benefit analyses as applied
to medical treatments. Assume that society’s preferences with respect to consumption of
commodities and health is described by a (differentiable) social welfare function
S(u1(h1, x1), . . . , um(hm, xm))
depending on the consumers’ utility from consuming marketed commodities x1, . . . , xl
as well as their health, which is described by several (say L) parameters or characteristics;
these characteristics cannot be bought directly in the market but may be achievable by
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individual and collective effort. In a very simple setup, the characteristics may be physical
and mental health (as in SF-36, cf. Ware (1995)), or it may be a much more detailed
description of definite aspects of health (moving, hearing, speaking, seeing, working etc.,
cf. Sintonen (1981)).
As usually, society’s gain from a small displacement in health and commodity
consumption can be assessed by
dS =
m∑
i=1
S′i
L∑
j=1
u′ijdhij +
m∑
i=1
S′i
l∑
j=1
u′ijdxij ;
Assuming that
– the commodities are bought at prices pj ,
– the income distribution in society is optimal for given health,
the second term reduces to Kp · ∑mi=1 dxi (this is obtained by substituting from the
consumers’ first order conditions λipj = u′ij (for utility maximzation at given prices
and income) and using that the Lagrangian multiplier λi is consumer i’s marginal utility
of income; the assumption of optimal income distribution then gives us that S′iλi is
independent of i, so that it equals some K > 0).
If we want to perform a similar reduction of the health part of the expression similarly,
then we need similar assumptions; since there is no market for health, we cannot state them
in the same way, but we can of course state what we need, that is
– the vectors of marginal utilities of each health parameter are all proportional,
i.e.
(u′ih)
L
h=1 = µiv, all i
for some vector v, and
– society’s initial distribution of any health parameter is optimal (so that S′ihu
′
ih =
S′i′hu
′
i′h for all consumers i and i
′, and for h = 1, . . . , L).
On this assumptions, the criterion for desirability of the displacement becomes
dS = Mv ·
m∑
i=1
dhi + Kp ·
m∑
i=1
dxi,
meaning that the evaluation reduces to assessing pairs (v · ∑mi=1 dhi, p · ∑mi=1 dxi)
according to a linear criterion with unknown weights M and K; comparison of such
pairs may then be performed using the ratio of the two coordinates, the celebrated cost-
effectiveness ratio of health economic appraisals. Thus, we have a theoretical foundation
of cost-effectiveness analysis in medicine (cf. Gold, 1996) , and as a by-product, we get a
QALY-like measure Q of health status displacements, namely by Q(dh) = v · h.
However, this project clearly hinges on its assumptions; those pertaining to social
optimality of distribution of income and health are to some extent inherent in the approach;
if welfare could be improved by redistribution already, there are conceptual difficulties in
measuring society’s gain from some new technology. But the assumption of proportional
3
vectors of marginal utility of health is an assumption which is open to debate; the present
paper investigates whether it can reasonably be expected to be fulfilled.
In order to access this problem, we consider a general equilibrium model with health
characteristics. We take as a point of departure that health states can be measured, even
in an objective way, at least when the description of the health state is sufficiently precise
(thus, a health characteristic should not be thought of as a particular aspect of health).
However, health is inherently individual and cannot be transferred. Consumers buy
commodities, which can be transferred, and use them to produce health. This approach to
health consumption using Lancaster’s (1971) consumer characteristics has already been
used in health economics, e.g. in the intertemporal health consumption model of Grossman
(1972), and the connection between QALYs and Lancaster’s characteristics was noticed
by Williams (1985) and Culyer (1990).
In the present paper we consider the general problem of whether the agents in an
economy where consumers buy goods which they transform to characteristics, will agree
on the marginal rates of substitutions, not of goods but of characteristics. In terms of
health status measures, we look for conditions on the economy which will give us that in
equilibrium, when each consumer has bought the best commodity bundle with a view to
its transformation to consumption and health, the marginal rates of substitution between
different types of health will be the same for all consumers. If this is not the case, there is
no a priori meaningful measure of overall health.
It might be noticed at this point that it is not a priori excluded that equality in
equilibrium of individual marginal rates of substitution for characteristics might hold
even without trade in characteristics. Indeed, the factor price equalization theorem of
international trade theory provides a similar case, where such an equality does obtain; and
in the paper we show that under conditions which are in a certain sense analogous, we get
a similar result. However, the main result is negative, since the conditions under which
equality of marginal rates of substitution between characteristics must be considered as
too restrictive to be widely satisfied in practice.
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we introduce the general model to
be used in the sequel. In section 3, we present some simple versions of the economies
of 2, and we show that in these models, the individual marginal rates of substitutions
between characteristics are different, not only in one or in some Pareto optimal allocation,
but essentially in all of them. Also, some results of a more general character are presented
here. In section 4, we turn the problem around and show that a rather strong condition
which is clearly sufficient for equality of individual marginal rates of substitution no
matter what the preference relations of the consumers would be, is also necessary. This
condition essentially amounts to separate production of characteristics - each characteristic
is obtained from commodity inputs in a way which is completely independent of what is
produced of the other characteristics. The concluding section 5 contains some discussion
of the results; in particular, we return to the initial problem of health measurement and
interpret our results in this context. The proof of Theorem 2 in section 2, which is rather
long, has been put in an appendix.
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2. A general model with consumer characteristics
We consider an economy E with l commodities. Consumers i ∈ {1, . . . , m} buy
commodity bundles xi ∈ Rl+ in the market and transform them into bundles ξi of L
different consumers’ characteristics which are used for final consumption.
There are m consumers, each having the set RL+ as feasible consumption set. The
consumer i has a preference relation ∼i on RL+. of consumption bundles; to obtain
the characteristics bundle, the consumer uses a household technology Ti ⊂ Rl+ × RL+
transforming commodity bundles to characteristics bundles; a household production is a
pair (xi, ξi) with xi a commodity bundle and ξi a characteristics bundle.
We shall treat commodity production (as distinct from household production of
commodities) in a very summary way: There is a given set Y ⊂ Rl+ of feasible aggregate
commodity bundles in the economy E .
We collect some assumptions on the economy E :
Assumption 1. The economy E satisfies the following assumptions:
(i) For each i, ∼i is continuous (the sets {ξ′i | ξ′i ∼iξi} and {ξ′i | ξi ∼iξ′i} are closed
for each ξi), weakly monotonic (ξ′i > ξi implies that ξ
′
i i ξi), and convex (for
each ξi, the set {ξ′i | ξ′i ∼iξi} is convex).
(ii) For each i, Ti is closed, convex, monotonic in the sense that for all (xi, ξi) ∈ Ti,
if x′i > xi (x
′
i ≥ xi, x′i = xi), then there is ξ′i > ξi (ξ′i ≥ ξi, ξ′i = ξi) with
(x′i, ξ
′
i) ∈ Ti, and relevant: if (xi, ξi) ∈ Ti and ξi > 0 (ξi ≥ 0, ξi = 0) , then
xi > 0 (xi ≥ 0, xi = 0). Finally, Ti satisfies free disposal: if (xi, ξi) ∈ Ti,
and if x′i ≥ xi, ξ′i ≤ ξi, then (x′i, ξ′i) ∈ Ti.
(iii) The set Y satisfies Y −Rl+ ⊂ Y (free disposal) and contains 0 in its interior.
It may be noticed at this point that since we have posed no restriction on l and L and
the nature of the characteristics, it may well be the case that some or all of the commodities
correspond to characteristics in a 1-1 way. Thus, there is no loss of generality in having
consumers’ preferences defined only on characteristics bundles rather than on goods-and-
characteristics bundles.
An allocation in the economy E is a pair (x, ξ), where x = (xi)mi=1 is a commodity
allocation and ξ = (ξi)mi=1 a characteristics allocation, that is for each consumer i, a
characteristics bundle ξi. An allocation (x, ξ) is individually feasible if
xi ∈ Rl+, (xi, ξi) ∈ Ti for each i,
and aggregate feasible if
∑m
i=1 xi ∈ Y ; it is feasible if it is both individually and aggregate
feasible.
An allocation (x, ξ) in E is Pareto optimal if it is feasible and there is no other feasible
allocation (x′, ξ′) such that ui(ξ′i) ≥ ui(ξi) for all i with at least one strict inequality.
An equilibrium in E is an array (x, ξ, p), where (x, ξ) is a feasible allocation and
p ∈ Rl+\{0} is a price system, such that
(i) for each consumer i, ξi maximizes ui on
{ξ′i | ∃x′i : (x′i, ξ′i) ∈ Ti, p · x′i ≤ p · xi},
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(ii)
∑m
i=1 xi maximizes p · y on Y .
The equilibrium concept used is standard (corresponding to the notion of a com-
pensated equilibrium in Debreu (1959)) except of course for the particular feature of our
model, that preferences are defined on characteristics and not on commodity bundles.
The classical first theorem of welfare economics holds for our model. We state it
below without proof, since it follows easily using the standard method of proof (cf. e.g.
Green, MasColell and Whinston, 1995).
Theorem 1. Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption 1, and let ((x, ξ), p) be an
equilibrium in E . Then (x, ξ) is Pareto optimal.
As will be shown below, also the second theorem of welfare economics holds in
E (provided that it satisfies Assumption 1). This means – as usual – that prices (of
commodities) may be used for decentralizing decisions in E , and that values at such
decentralizing prices may be used to decide on the desirability of small displacements of
the allocation from a Pareto optimal situation.
However, this may not be good enough for the purposes at hand. Assume for example
that a new technique for producing characteristics (in the case of health characteristics,
this may be a new treatment or a new type of medicine) must be evaluated; what is
known then is the input-output relationships of the new techniques but not the changes
in overall allocation of commodities brought about by the introduction of the technique.
For an a priori evaluation of the welfare effects of the new technique the shadow prices of
characteristics are called for. We therefore introduce another equilibrium concept where
these shadow prices are made explicit.
An extended equilibrium is an array (x, ξ, p, q), where (x, ξ) is a feasible allocation
p a price system on commodities, and q = (qi)mi=1 a family of (individual) price vectors
qi ∈ RL+ on characteristics, such that
(i’) for each consumer i, ξi maximizes ui on
{ξ′′i | ∃(x′i, ξ′i) ∈ Ti, qi · ξ′′i ≤ p · xi + (qi · ξ′i − p · x′i)},
(ii’)
∑m
i=1 xi maximizes p · y on Y .
Condition (i’) may need some comment: In the equilibrium, the consumer is assumed
to be endowed with an income for buying commodities in the market which exactly
makes it possible to buy xi. Performing a household production means that the bundle
of value p · xi is given up but that a characteristics bundle of shadow value qi · ξi is
obtained. The individual optimization condition tells us that the consumer cannot improve
by any household production, in the sense that the shadow profit obtained will not give the
consumer a higher shadow value for consumption of characteristics.
We note that an extended equilibrium is an equilibrium (so that the notion ‘extended’
refers only to the number of variables which are made explicit in the equilibrium): If
(x, ξ, p, q) is an extended equilibrium, then (ii) is trivially satisfied; to check (i), let ξ′i i ξi,
with (x′i, ξ
′
i) ∈ Ti for some x′i. From (i’) we get that
qi · ξ′i > p · xi + (qi · ξ′ − p · x′i)
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or p · x′i > p · xi which is (i).
Clearly, the allocation (x, ξ) belonging to an extended equilibrium is Pareto optimal
(given Assumption 1); what is more important is that with our new concept, we get a version
of the second theorem of welfare theory with explicit shadow prices on characteristics.
Theorem 2. Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption 1, and let (x, ξ) be a Pareto
optimal allocation in E , where ξi ∈ RL++ for all i. Then there is price system p on
commodities and a system of individual characteristics prices q = (qi)mi=1 such that
(1) (x, ξ, p, q) is an extended price equilibrium;
(2) if (x′, ξ′) is an individually feasible allocation with
m∑
i=1
qi · ξ′i >
m∑
i=1
qi · ξi,
then (x′, ξ′) is a potential Pareto improvement in the sense that there is an individually
feasible allocation (x′′, ξ′′) with
∑m
i=1 p · x′′i =
∑m
i=1 p · x′i and such that ξ′′i i ξi for
all i.
The proof of Theorem 2, which uses the standard method of embedding the given
economy in an ordinary economy with a larger commodity space, is given in the appendix.
The notion of a potential Pareto improvement is adapted to the present model: incomes
for commodity purchases (evaluated at the equilibrium prices p) can be redistributed in
such a way that everyone can buy a commodity bundle which is as good as (and for some
consumers strictly better than) the bundles prescibed by (x, ξ).
The result of theorem 2 provides the basis for using characteristics or shadow prices
in welfare considerations: Changes in overall welfare may be evaluated by computing the
aggregate value of the characteristics consumption. However, this welfare measure uses
individual shadow prices, and as such it is hardly of any practical use. In order to be
operational, a welfare measure of individual quantity displacements should use shadow
prices which are independent of individuals. Unless the shadow prices qi turn out to
be equal or proportional in at least fairly many Pareto optimal allocations, measuring
welfare changes by changes in shadow values has no theoretical foundation. The question
therefore is whether such equality obtains reasonably often, and this will be investigated
in the following sections.
3. Equality of individual characteristics prices almost never obtains
In this section we show that the equality of characteristics prices for different individuals,
which as we argued, is a precondition for their use in welfare comparisons, is an event
which in general economies happen very rarely.
We start by presenting the ideas in a simple example.
Example 1. The economy E below has two consumers; there is only one commodity,
l = 1. Consumers transform amounts of this commodity into bundles of two different
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characteristics (so L = 2) using a a household technology T , assumed to be the same for
both consumers and given by (x, (ξ1, ξ2)) ∈ T if
(ξ21 + ξ
2
2)
1/2 ≤ x.
Thus, the characteristics are made under conditions of joint production, and there are
constant returns to scale.
Define the utility functions by
u1(ξ11, ξ12) = ξ11ξ412
u2(ξ21, ξ22) = ξ421ξ22;
there is an initial endowment of 1 unit of the commodity, i.e. Y = {y ∈ R | y ≤ 1}.
We obtain all Pareto optimal allocations (x, ξ) by dividing the initial endowment
between consumers and letting them produce characteristics from this endowment in such
a way as to maximize utility. Thus, let x1 ∈ [0, 1]; then ξ1 and ξ2 satisfy
ξ21 + ξ
2
2 = x
2
1, ξ
2
1 + ξ
2
2 = (1− x1)2,
and adding the individual maximization conditions, we get that
ξ1 =
(
x1√
5
,
2x1√
5
)
, ξ2 =
(
2(1− x1)√
5
,
(1− x1)√
5
)
.
We may now find the marginal rate of substitution between characteristics for
consumer 1 as
MRS1 =
∂u1
∂ξ1
/∂u1
∂ξ2
=
1
4
ξ12
ξ11
=
1
2
,
and similarly, the marginal rate of substitution for consumer 2 is found as MRS2 = 2.
Thus, the marginal rates of substition are independent of the parameter x1 and the same in
all the Pareto optimal allocations (except for x1 = 0 or x1 = 1, where any individual price
vector is a support for the preferred set of the individual getting nothing). In particular, the
two marginal rates of substitutions are different, no matter which Pareto optimal allocation
we consider.
The results obtained in the example are, as may be seen immediately, not connected
with the choice of dimensions or the particular numerical values of the parameters chosen.
Indeed, the following result generalizes the insights of the example to all economies
where all consumers have the same constant-returns-to-scale technology, and where there
are at least two consumers differing in their (homothetical) preferences for characteristics
bundles:
Theorem 3. Let E be an economy satisfying Assumption 1 and such that
(i) T1 = . . . = Tm = T (all household technologies are identical), and T is a
convex cone in Rl+ ×RL+ (constant returns to scale),
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(ii) for each i, the preference relation ∼i is homothetical in the sense that if ξi ∼iξ′i
then λξi ∼iλξ′i for all λ > 0.
Assume that
(1) For each p ∈ Rl+, the set
T (p) = {ξ ∈ RL+ | ∃x ∈ Rl+, p · x = 1, (x, ξ) ∈ T}
is strictly convex in RL+,
(2) there are two consumers, say 1 and 2, such that for all ξ ∈ RL++, the sets
{q ∈ RL+ | ξ′ ∼1ξ ⇒ q · ξ′ ≥ q · ξ} and {q ∈ RL+ | ξ′ ∼2ξ ⇒ q · ξ′ ≥ q · ξ}
of supports of the preferred sets at ξ for consumers 1 and 2 are disjoint.
Then there are no extended equilibria (x, ξ, p, q) of E with p · xi > 0 for all i, such that
q1 = · · · = qm.
Proof: Assume to the contrary that there is an extended equilibrium in E with q1 = · · · =
qm = q. Consider the two consumers 1 and 2 satisfying the conditions (2) of the theorem.
Then ξi is maximal for ∼i on the set of characteristics bundles which can be produced
in T from some input x′i satisfying p · x′i ≤ p · xi, i = 1, 2. Clearly, we must have that
ξ1 = λξ2 for all λ > 0 by the condition (2).
Let λi = 1/p · xi, and consider the bundles λiξi for i = 1, 2. By homotheticity
of ∼i and constant returns to scale of T , we have that λiξi is maximal for ∼i on T (p),
i = 1, 2. We conclude that q supports T (p) at λiξi for i = 1, 2, and consequently, by the
strict convexity of T (p) there is some ξ′′ ∈ T (p) with
q · ξ′′ > q · (λ1ξ1) = q · (λ2ξ2),
contradicting that λiξi is maximal for ∼ i on T (p), i = 1, 2. We conclude that q1 = q2,
and this proves the theorem.
The assumptions of the theorem may perhaps look restrictive; however, they all
express ordinary properties of well-behaved economies (constant returns to scale, homo-
theticity of preferences) and they are usually satisfied in textbook examples. Thus, the
main message to be obtained from the theorem is that equality of characteristics prices
does not obtain , unless the consumers are all identical, in which case the problem was
trivial from the outset.
It is rather obvious that the similar examples of economies where all equilibria have
different individual characteristics prices can be obtained with identical preferences but
different technologies. Even if both household technologies and preferences are identical
among consumers we may still get such results, provided that we drop the assumption of
constant returns to scale in the household technology:
Example 2. Suppose that the common household technology T is such that (x, ξ) ∈ T if
(tξ21 + ξ
2
2)
1/2 ≤ t, t ≤ x,
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and that both consumers have the utility function u with
u(ξ1, ξ2) = ξ1ξ2.
As before, we find all Pareto optimal allocations by choosing x1 ∈ [0, 1] and maximizing
u under each of the constraints
x1ξ
2
11 + ξ
2
12 = x
2
1, (1− x1)ξ221 + ξ222 = (1− x1)2.
This gives us the characteristics bundles
ξ1 =
(√
x1
2
,
x1√
2
)
, ξ2 =
(√
(1− x1)
2
,
1− x1√
2
)
.
Once more we have inequality of marginal rates of substitution, which with the particular
utility function are MRS1 =
√
x1 and MRS2 =
√
1− x1, respectively, differing except
in the case x1 = (1− x1) where the identical consumers are treated equally.
Summing up, we have shown that in well-behaved economies, consumers end up
with different shadow prices on non-marketed goods in all except in a few, exceptional
cases. It is fairly clear that the results generalize to less well-behaved economies, as long
as the common household technology features some kind of strict convexity, and some
consumers differ in their characteristics preferences. Thus, it is to be expected that many
or most equilibria will be such that characteristics prices of at least two consumers differ,
thus making the use of a common characteristics price in cost-benefit analysis illusory.
4. Conditions for common evaluation of characteristics
In the previous sections, our main emphasis has been on nonequality of marginal rates
of substitution for characteristics. In doing so, a particular condition on the household
technology emerged, as stated in (1) of Theorem 3. We show in the present section that
this condition is crucial: if it fails, then the ensuing economy will exhibit equality of
characteristics prices in its extended equilibria.
Throughout this section, we assume constant returns to scale in the household
production, which is assumed identical for all consumers. As an intuitive starting point,
we notice that if household production is separable in the sense that production of each
characteristics is carried out separately, with a technology that does not depend on the
level of production of the other characteristics, then each characteristic will have a unique
shadow price depending only on the commodity prices, so that characteristics prices of
individual consumers are indeed the same.
In this section, we show that separability in the above sense of the common household
technology is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for equality of individual
characteristics prices. We start with an intermediate result which uses the sets
T (p) = {ξ ∈ RL+ | ∃x ∈ Rl+, p · x = 1, (x, ξ) ∈ T},
for p ∈ Rl++ introduced in the previous section.
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Theorem 4. Let T ⊂ Rl+×RL+ be a household technology satisfying constant returns to
scale, and let ET be the class of economies satisfying Assumption 1 such that all consumers
have the household technology T . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) for all economies E ∈ ET , all extended equilibria (x, ξ, p, q) of E with ξi = 0 for
all i satisfy q1 = · · · = qm,
(ii) for all p ∈ Rl++, the set T (p) is the intersection with RL+ of a half-space in RL.
Proof: (ii) ⇒ (i): Let E ∈ ET , and let (x, ξ, p, q) be an extended equilibrium. Then by
the condition (i’) of extended equilibria, for each i the characteristics bundle ξi is maximal
for ∼i on the set of all
{ξ′′i | qi · ξ′′i ≤ p · xi + max
(x′
i
,ξ′
i
)∈Ti
[qi · ξ′i − p · x′i]} = {ξ′′i | qi · ξ′′i ≤ qi · ξi};
clearly, this set contains
Ti(p) = {ξ′i | ∃x′i : p · x′i ≤ p · xi, (x′i, ξ′i) ∈ Ti},
and ξi belongs to the boundary of Ti(p). Now, by constant returns to scale of T , we have
that Ti(p) = λiT (p), where λi = p · xi, and using (ii) we get that
T (p) = λ−1{ξ′′i | qi · ξ′′i ≤ qi · ξi}.
Since the left hand side is independent of i, so is the right hand side, and we conclude that
q1 = · · · = qm.
(i)⇒ (ii): Let C = {c1, . . . , ci, . . .} ⊂ RL++ be a countable dense subset of RL+, and
let pˆ ∈ Rl++ be arbitrary. For each natural number m, we define an economy Em ∈ ET
with m consumers i = 0, 1, . . . , m− 1 as follows: Consumer 0 has preferences such that
ξ′ ∼0ξ if and only if
∑L
h=1 ξ
′
h ≥
∑L
h=1 ξh. For i = 1, . . . , m− 1, let the preferences of
consumer i be described by the utility function
ui(ξ) = min
h=1,...,L
ξh
cih
.
The aggregate availability set Y ⊂ Rl is defined by
Y = {y ∈ Rl | p · y ≤ 0, y1 ≤ 1},
(so that commodity 1 is available in the magnitude 1 and can be used as input, whereas
the other commodities can only be obtained as output).
Let (x, ξ, p, q) be an extended equilibrium in Em. By our assumption, q0 = · · · =
qm−1 = q¯. We claim that
∑m−1
i=0 ξi > 0. Suppose not, then there is h ∈ {1, . . . , L}
such that ξih = 0 for all i and consequently ui(ξi) = 0 for i ≥ 1. If ξi = 0, then also
xi = 0 (here we use relevance, cf. Assumption 1(ii)), and then by monotonicity of T (also
in Assumption 1(ii)) there is ξ′i 0 ξ0 with (x0 + xi, ξ′0) ∈ T , contradicting the Pareto
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optimality of (x, ξ) (if consumer i gets utility 0 anyway then her commodities could just
as well be given to consumer 0, who would become better off). This proves our claim.
By Assumption 1(ii) (relevance), we now conclude that
∑m
i=1 xi > 0, and it follows
from equilibrium condition (ii’) that p = pˆ. Arguing as above, we have that ξi maximizes
q¯ · ξ on
{ξ | ∃x : pˆ · x ≤ pˆ · xi, (x, ξ) ∈ Ti},
and by constant returns to scale, we have that λ−1i ξi maximizes q¯ · ξ on T (pˆ), where
λi = pˆ · xi, each i. We conclude that conv({λ−1i ξi | i = 1, . . . , m − 1}) belongs to
the intersection of bd T (pˆ) with a hyperplane {ξ | q¯ · ξ = M}, where M = λ−1i q¯ · ξi is
independent of i.
Next, we notice that q¯k > 0 for all k since otherwise consumer 0 would not satisfy
the individual optimality constraint (i’) at ξ0. But this means that for i ≥ 1,
λ−1i ξi =
M
q¯ · ci ci,
so that for m large enough, the set conv({λ−1i ξi | i = 1, . . . , m − 1}) gets as close as
desired to {ξ ∈ RL+ | q¯· = M}. But then
T (pˆ) = {ξ ∈ RL+ | q¯ ≤ M},
and since pˆ was arbitrary, we have shown (ii).
A household technology T ⊂ Rl+ ×RL+ is separable if T =
∑L
k=1 T
k with
T k ⊂ Rl+ × {ξ ∈ RL+ | ξj = 0, j = k}
for k = 1, . . . , L. Thus, a characteristics bundle ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξL) is obtained by producing
each characteristic ξk separately in the technology T k. For p ∈ Rl++ we have that
T (p) = conv(0, ξ1(p), . . . , ξL(p)),
where the characteristics vector ξk(p) for k = 1, . . . , L are defined as the solution to the
problem
max{ξk | (x, ξ) ∈ T k, p · x = 1},
so T (p) has the structure of an intersection of RL+ with a half-space. Our final result shows
that the converse holds as well, so that this property characterizes separable technologies.
Theorem 5. Let T ⊂ Rl+ ×RL+ be a constant-returns-to-scale satisfying Assumption
1(ii), and suppose that for all p ∈ Rl++, the set
T (p) = {ξ ∈ RL+ | ∃x ∈ Rl+, p · x = 1, (x, ξ) ∈ T}
is the intersection of RL+ with a half-space. Then T is separable.
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Proof: For k = 1, . . . , L, define T k by
T k = T ∩ {(x, ξ) ∈ Rl+ ×RL+ | ξj = 0, j = k}.
Then T k is a convex cone contained in T , each k, and
∑L
k=1 T
k ⊂ T .
Assume that (x, ξ) ∈ T but (x, ξ) /∈ ∑Lk=1 T k. Then for every array (x1, . . . , xL) ∈
(Rl)L such that (xk, ek) ∈ T k for each k (where ek is the kth unit vector in RL), we have
that x = ∑Lk=1 ξkxk. The set
C =
{
L∑
k=1
ξkx
k | (xk, ek) ∈ T k, k = 1, . . . , L
}
is closed and convex (by convexity of each of the sets T k), and
{x′ ∈ Rl | x′ ≤ x} ∩ C = ∅
(by the free disposal property of household technologies), so by separation of convex sets,
there is p ∈ Rl++ with
p · x = 1,
p · x′ > 1 for x′ ∈ C.
However, by the assumptions of the Theorem, we know that there are (xˆk, ξˆk) ∈ T k
with p · xˆk = 1, k = 1, . . . , L, such that
ξ =
L∑
k=1
λk ξˆ
k
for some λ1, . . . , λL ≥ 0 with
∑L
k=1 λk = 1. Clearly, for each k we have that λk ξˆ
k
k = ξk,
meaning that (λkxˆk, ξkek) ∈ Ti, and
L∑
k=1
λkxˆ
k ∈ C.
However, since p · xˆk = 1 for each k, we get that
p ·
(
L∑
k=1
λkxˆ
k
)
=
L∑
k=1
λk(p · xˆk) = 1,
contradicting that p · x′ > 1 for each x′ ∈ C.
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5. Discussion
The results above, in particular those of the previous section, tell us that for equality of
individual assessments of characteristics to obtain not only in particular cases but in all
extended equilibria, the household technology will have to be separable, so that each of
the characteristics are produced from suitable commodity bundles without any mutual
interaction. This does not seem reasonable, in particular not in the application of the
model to health, where different aspects of health usually come together. Thus, the basic
(implicit) assumptions for constructing an index of health, namely that all individuals value
the different aspects of health in the same way, must be considered as rather too restrictive.
There is, of course, a way of justifying the use of QALYs or similar one-dimensional
health status measures namely by postulating the individuals are indeed identical w.r.t.
to preferences over characteristics bundles. This seems however a somewhat strange
assumption which from the point of view of an economist calls for an explanation. We do
not readily expect that people agree in their preferences over ordinary consumption goods
(even if they do to some degree), and indeed economic theory would look quite differently
if this were to be the basic assumption underlying demand theory. Similarly, there seems
to be little a priori reason that all should agree in their ranking of different aspects of health.
Moreover, the experience of practical QALY measurement does not readily support such
a hypothesis.
When simple methods of aggregating fail, there is of course a need for other methods
which do not use ad hoc aggregation. In the context of economic appraisals of medicine,
where the tradition calls for a cost-effectiveness ratio, an alternative approach almost
suggests itself: the basic setup, where several alternative treatments have to be compared,
each of which are defined by a cost and a vector of outcome parameters, is formally
identical to the problem of measuring efficiency in organizations with well-defined costs
but outputs which are not marketed and therefore have no natural prices associated. In
this context, the individual projects cannot be given a total ranking as was the case when
cost-effectiveness ratios can be calculated meaningfully, but each project can be given a
cost-effectiveness ranking relative to the other projects (which may include the status quo).
Thus, an economic analysis may still give the decision maker valuable information, which
moreover is not based on subjective aggregation performed by the analyst.
Summing up, existing methods of constructing health status measures used to
calculate cost-effectiveness ratios is are based on implicit assumptions which are more
restrictive than what is otherwise assumed when carrying out this type of economic
appraisals. It is possible to avoid these assumptions if it is not insisted that the results
of the appraisals shall take the form of a ratio expressing outcome per dollar invested, but
only a measure of the position of any given project relative to the totality of other projects
available.
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Below we give the proof of Theorem 2 stated in section 2:
Proof of Theorem 2: (1) For each consumer i, define the set
P 0i = {ξ′i ∈ RL+ | ξ′i ∼iξi}
of as-good-or-better consumption programs; Pi is closed and convex by our assumptions
on ∼i; we embed Pi in Rl+mL putting 0 in all places except in the ith of the m segments
of L coordinates. Denote the resulting set by P˜i.
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For each i, let T˜i be the set Ti embedded in Rl+mL by putting 0 in all coordinates
except the first l, where the sign of is reversed, and the ith segment of L coordinates.
Again, Ti is closed and convex. Finally, the closed and convex set Y ⊂ Rl is embedded
in Rl+mL as Y˜ by adding 0s in all but the first l coordinates.
Now consider the set
Z =
m∑
i=1
P˜i −
n∑
i=1
T˜i − Y˜ ;
We have that Z is closed and convex, and that it contains the zero vector, which has the
representation
0 =
n∑
i=1
ξ˜i −
n∑
i=1
˜(xi, ξi)− y˜
for some y ∈ Y (here a˜ denotes the image of a by the ˜ -mapping). We claim that
Z ∩ Neg = ∅, where Neg is the cone of negative vectors in Rl+mL. Suppose to the
contrary that u ∈ Z ∩ Neg, so that
u =
n∑
i=1
ξ˜′i −
n∑
i=1
˜(x′i, ξ′i)− y˜′
for some y′ ∈ Y ; but this means that the allocation (x′, ξ′) is at least as good as (xi, ξi)
and that there is a feasible allocation (x′′i , ξi) with x
′′
i > x
′
i for all i. By the monotonicity
properties of Ti and ∼i, i = 1, . . . , m, there is then a feasible allocation (x′′i , ξ′′i ) with
ξ′′i ∼iξi, contradicting Pareto optimality.
Now, by separation of the convex sets Z and Neg, there exists a non-negative vector
(p, q) = (p, (qi)mi=1) ∈ Rl+mL such that the scalar product (p, q)·z for z ∈ Z is minimized
at z = 0. But this means that
(a) y maximizes p · y on Y , i.e. ∑mi=1 xi ∈ Yp, which is condition (ii’) of an
extended price equilibrium, that
(b) ξi minimizes qi · ξ′i on Pi, which, by the interiority condition, implies that
q · ξ′′i > q · ξi for all ξ′′i with ξ′′i i ξi, and that
(c) (xi, ξi) maximizes qi · ξ′i − p · x′i on Ti.
To check equilibrium condition (i’), let i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and assume that ξ′′i satisfies
the inequality
qi · ξ′′i ≤ p · xi + max
(x′
i
,ξ′
i
)∈Ti
[qi · ξ′i − p′ · x′i].
Then from (c) we get that qi · ξ′′i ≤ p · xi + [qi · ξi − p · xi] = qi · ξi, and (b) implies that
ξi ∼iξ′′i , which is (i’).
To show part (2) of the theorem, let (x′, ξ′) be an allocation with the properties stated.
Since qi · ξ′i − p · x′i ≤ qi · ξi − p · xi by the equilibrium conditions, we have that
p · x′i ≥ qi · (ξ′i − ξi) + p · xi;
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summing over i and using that
∑m
i=1 ξ
′
i >
∑m
i=1 ξi, we get that
m∑
i=1
p · x′i >
m∑
i=1
p · xi.
Choose positive numbers w1, . . . , wm with
∑m
i=1 wi =
∑m
i=1 p · x′i, and let
x′′i = xi +
wi∑l
h=1 ph
(1, . . . , 1)
for i = 1 . . . , m. Then
∑m
i=1 x
′′
i =
∑m
i=1 x
′
i, and by monotonicity of household
production and of preferences, there are ξ′′i with (x
′′
i , ξ
′′
i ) ∈ Ti such that ξ′′i i ξi,
i = 1, . . . , m, which proves that (x′, ξ′) is a potential Pareto improvement.
17
